Saturday, December 4, 2010

Leaked Secrets

The leaking of thousands of confidential messages by WikiLeaks has caused dismay in the diplomatic world, despite the soothing words of foreign policy observers and journalists who observe that there is actually little in these revelations that is really new. Official anger is considerable, with the US government taking the predictable line that the leaking of its secret puts lives at risk. At first sight that claim is neither strong nor very credible: Most of the published information is at worst embarrassing. However, one of the main goals of diplomacy is to avoid war; and it is certainly arguable that diplomacy must often be confidential to be effective.

The cause of the leak is also interesting. Apparently all this "secret" information was found in a computer system that is accessible to, depending on the source, anywhere between 2.5 and 3 million members of the American administration and military. The system was created after 9/11 to collect data that could be mined for information about possible terrorist actions, at first sight a commendable goal. Apparently it is trivially easy to extract data from it and burn those files on a DVD, a circumstance that seems less than commendable from a security point of view. It all appears rather amateurish.

However, it is as well to keep in mind that the first step to data security is to decide what data should be secured, and at what level. It is important to make distinctions and gradations in this, because there should be a link between the value of the information and the level of protection that is applied. The most secure system should be used infrequently and by a small group of people, and it should contain only information that is really highly important. In the case of the famous German Enigma cryptography system which was attacked so effectively by Allied cryptographers during the Second World War, the work of cryptanalysts was greatly simplified by the fact that the same system was used for both valuable strategic information and for trivial, stereotypical weather forecasts.

On the gliding scale of secrecy, it is difficult to argue that diplomatic observations that the Italian prime minister parties too much and a British prince behaved tactlessly and foolishly, can or should be rated Galactic Top Secret. Embarrassing as such comments may be, there seems not much of a case for rating them more than Confidential, and a pretty moderate confidentiality at that. The loutish arrogance of many comments made by US ambassadors should remind us of the sad reality that few of these men are professional diplomats. One becomes US ambassadors by having distinguished looks, a high level of tolerance for cocktail parties, and being a generous donor to a successful presidential election campaign. The latter characteristic is undeniably the most decisive one. These are not the criteria for producing brilliant diplomatic insights.

Putting such information in a data mining system that is widely accessible does not appear to be particularly objectionable from a security point of view. On the other hand, as information it is so low-grade that one should seriously challenge its inclusion in a data mining system, where it is just noise. Given that many US ambassadors are awarded there prestigious posts as a reward for their generous financial support in presidential election campaign, we should perhaps not be surprised to find this kind of gossip here. One hopes that communications from professional US diplomats have a bit more meat on the bone.

The question is what more information is in there, besides the juicy bits for the press. There have been reports that since 9/11, high security level clearances have been issued to a very large group of people: A practice that suggests that too much information has been declared to be secret, with a too high level of secrecy, and which is likely to have the ironic results that the real secrets are no longer very secure.

The Art of Military Euphemism

On a fairly regular basis, journalists publish rants about the euphemistic language used by the world's military forces, and in particular their use of such terms as "collateral damage" and "friendly fire". On linguistic grounds, one can object to these terms, but the reality is that they are not particularly euphemistic, as everybody knows precisely what they imply. And they merely scrape the top of the iceberg of military jargon, which contains many gems worthy of closer scrutiny.

Peace Marble. The Pentagon has the long-standing habit of given code names to all military operations and projects. Among these projects are deliveries of weaponry to other countries under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. If these involve combat aircraft, these programs are traditionally given code names that begin with Peace, a habit that suggest that program managers suffer from a severe irony deficiency. Under the code name Peace Marble one finds sales of F-16 fighter jets to Israel. Peace Vector covers similar deliveries to Egypt, and Peace Gate to Pakistan.

Blue Circle. After the end of the Second World War, the British military used as system of 'Rainbow' codes, in which code names always consisted of a color and a noun. Hence Blue Danube, Orange Herald and Red Beard were names given to nuclear weapons, while Blue Vixen, Indigo Corkscrew, and Yellow Aster were radar systems. The sobriquet of Blue Circle originated in 1984, when due to technical problems, a number of new and very expensive Tornado ADV interceptor jets were delivered without their radar systems, and blocks of concrete were "installed" instead to maintain the balance of the aircraft. This ballast was promptly (and unofficially) dubbed Blue Circle, after the well-known brand of cement.

Delivery of kinetic effect. Kinetic energy is the energy of a moving object, and in particular is a property of small fast-moving objects, such as bullets. Kinetic effect is what happens when these strike their target. Hence delivery of kinetic effect has become official code for the acts of shooting or bombing. Close kin to this phrase is kinetic military action, which of course means combat. And yes, military officers routinely use this obfuscating terminology.

Animal, Vegetable, or Mineral. Under the official aircraft naming system introduced in the Royal Air Force in 1918 all fighter aircraft had to be given names of a zoological, vegetable or mineral nature. Seriously. The specific sub-category depended on the number of crew members: Two-seat fighters were to be named after mammals, but single-seat fighters after birds, reptiles or insects. The names also had to alliterate with the name of the manufacturer. This concept of an overheated bureaucratic imagination did result in experimental combat aircraft with enchanting names such as the Sopwith Snail, Westland Wagtail and Gloster Gnatsnapper. Perhaps unfortunately, this poetic system lasted only until 1927. In 1932 the RAF decided that hence forth fighter aircraft would get names reflecting speed, activity, or aggressiveness.

Just Cause. In a famous memorandum during WWII, Winston Churchill pointed out to his general staff that  military operations should not have names that are over-confident, boastful, despondent, or frivolous. Other obvious requirements for code names should be that do not give away the nature of the operation to the enemy, and of course that they are distinct enough to avoid confusion. The US invasion of Panama in 1988 set a dubious precedent for another practice: The selection of code names that are blatant and transparent public relations efforts. Just Cause was the first in a series that now includes toe-curling gems such as Iraqi Freedom.